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ABSTRACT The increasing complexity of modern day networked applications and the massive demand on
the Internet resources has reignited interest and concern in the underlying networking infrastructures and
their ability to cope with such complexity and adapt to the demands of the business applications, particularly
where such applications require a high degree of robustness and reliability. As a result, software-defined
networking has emerged as a promising approach to the definition of network architectures that could carry
a high degree of adaptability and robustness reminiscent of the future Internet. Fault tolerance and network
updates are considered two of the current research challenges that hamper the growth of software-defined
networking in this area. Therefore, this paper represents a step toward tackling these two issues in the context
of single link failures. Our main contribution lies in the definition of new algorithms that aim to enhance
the problem of finding alternative paths in large-scale networks with minimal cost and time-to-update
factors. The new solution aims at increasing the efficiency of flow operation reduction during link failures.
We evaluate our framework and show how its implementation results in improved efficiency.
INDEX TERMS Fault-tolerance, optimisation, resilience, network topology, software-defined networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recently emerged paradigm of Software Defined
Networking (SDN) has gained a wide interest due to its
promising potential of simplifying computer networks man-
agement and control. In an SDN, the network architecture
differs from traditional networks in that the control plane is
moved from the network forwarding elements to a central
control layer called the controller. The decoupling between
the control and data planes results in dumb forwarding ele-
ments whose packet forwarding behaviour is dictated by
the controller. As a result, an SDN gives the ability to cre-
ate a programmable network that can be managed like any
other computing device. So far, OpenFlow [1] has been the
most commonly used protocol for enabling an SDN con-
troller to instruct data plane elements using forwarding rules.
Such benefits of the SDN paradigm meant that SDNs are
nowadays adopted by many of the well known pioneering
companies like Deutsche Telekom, Google, Microsoft, Ver-
izon, and CISCO, which have recently combined in 2011 to
launch the Open Network Foundation (ONF) [2] as a non-
profit consortium that aims to accelerate the adoption of
SDN technologies.
Although SDNs have brought many advantages with
dramatic network improvements, this innovation has been
accompanied by several challenges, such as the management
of network failures, the updating of the network architecture
and the monitoring of its status [3], [4]. On one hand, some
issues are associated with the control plane, such as the time
required for updating a topology. On the other hand, other
issues could affect the data plane, for example the capacity
of the flow tables where the controller rules are to be stored
in the forwarding elements. Additionally, there are also issues
that could affect both planes, for example failure occurrences.
The occurrence of failures typically results in a number
of changes that have to be made in order to mask the fail-
ure and keep operating the network in a normal manner.
As the SDN controller has a global view on the network’s
topology state, it can employ two types of mechanisms
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for dealing with data plane failures: proactive (protection)
and reactive (restoration) mechanisms [4]. In the protec-
tion mechanism, an OpenFlow controller1 computes alterna-
tive paths (known as backup paths) in advance and installs
the forwarding rules for those paths in the forwarding ele-
ments before the failure event has even occurred. Hence,
this technique proactively masks failure. On the other hand,
the restoration mechanism behaves reactively as the con-
troller installs the proper rules for the alternative paths at the
moment of failure. For both techniques, there are pros and
cons as will be described later.
The problem of updating the network, for correctness pur-
poses, can be considered as a manifold due to its crucial role
in many of the network activities. Reconfiguring the flow
entries (rules) of a forwarding element’s flow table usually
takes place for various reasons, such as link/node failure,
security policymanagement and traffic engineering [5]. Some
aspects such as delay, consistency and congestion, have to be
taken into account during the process of updating as these
could cause negative impact on the network’s Quality of Ser-
vice (QoS). For instance, in the scenario of link/node failure,
a slow update will increase the percentage of packet loss.
A controller could be placed remotely and may not be con-
nected directly to the switches that belong to its domain [6],
which makes the update operation even more critical.
To reduce the process duration of network updates and speed
up the restoration from link failures in large scale networks,
we are going to propose, implement and evaluate in this
paper two novel methods within our proposed fault tolerance
framework to find the optimal solution to such problems.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II,
various SDN fault tolerance techniques are presented and
discussed. Section III presents the problem statement and the
contributions of this paper. In Section IV, our model of SDN
single failures is presented. We then illustrate the proposed
framework to solve these failures using the set of proposed
algorithms in Section V. Section VI demonstrates how the
proposed algorithms were implemented using SDN tools in
our experiments. All the experimental results of this work are
presented in Section VII, and finally, we conclude the paper
and provide an overview of future work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The link failure issue happens frequently in large scale net-
works, thus the topic of recovery from failure is not new and
considerable amount of literature has been published in this
context. While SDN architectures emerge as a dynamic and
flexible answer to the more traditional, but static and rigid
network architectures, more research in this area becomes
necessary. We discuss here a few recent works that we con-
sider directly related to our approach and results.
In [7], the authors have shown how to achieve fast
data plane recovery through implementing an OpenFlow
1We use the terms OpenFlow controller and SDN controller
interchangeably.
monitoring function. In the same context, the authors in [8]
defined the OpenFlow-based Segment Protection (OSP)
scheme as a data plane protection method. Proactive mech-
anisms for tackling the issue are expensive, especially for
large networks, since extra rules need to be stored as a
backup. Current OpenFlow devices in the market are capable
of storing only up to 8000 flow entries due to the limitation of
the Ternary Content-AddressableMemory (TCAM), which is
costly [9]. Rather than this, the installation of many attributes
will affect the process of match-and-action for the forwarding
elements in the data plane. In addition, there is no guarantee
that the pre-installed or pre-planned paths are failure-free,
in other words, the backup path could fail earlier than the
primary one.
In [10] and [11], the authors introduced fast restoration
methods for OpenFlow networks. In both works, the testing
of the methods is carried out based on small scale network
topologies of no more than 6 to 14 nodes. Processing time is
not taken into account, which is a requirement in SDNs for
the re-routing from the affected primary paths to alternative
paths (typically computed by the controller). Although the
performance of current OpenFlow switches varies according
to their vendor, in [12], the authors reported that the range
of time required for inserting a single flow entry varies from
0.5ms to 10ms. Therefore, the required time for rule insertion
is not negligible and can not be ignored, especially from the
point of view of a path failure, since at the moment of failure,
we are not only concerned with new flow rule insertion, but
also with the removal of invalid old rules. In [13], it was
demonstrated that a time of 11ms (at least) is required for each
rule modification; i.e. the latency caused by the insertion and
deletion operations. Thus, the restorationmechanism requires
significant time duration in comparison to the protection
mechanism. Overall, it is rare to obtain a full data plane
restoration in a large scale network within 50ms [11], and
in [4], the authors indicated that a time delay of between
200ms and 300ms is more realistic.
Some works utilise the principle of disjoint path to recover
from failures. For example, CORONET [14] is presented
as an SDN fault-tolerant system with the capability to deal
withmultiple link failure scenarios. The ADaptiveMulti-Path
Computation Framework (ADMPCF) [15] for large scale
OpenFlow network systems has been developed as another
traffic engineering tool for SDNs, which can hold two ormore
disjoint paths to be utilised at the moment of occurrence
of some network event (e.g. link failure). As a result, those
precomputed paths can be used as backups in the case of
a link/node failure or when the defined cost function does
not meet its acceptable limit. For both of the aforementioned
works, the path is computed in an early stage before the
failure event occurs and, in order to ensure the path validity,
a disjoint path selection process is conducted to maximise
the reliability of the alternative paths. In other words, both
ADMPCF and CORONET behave reactively, i.e. the con-
troller will always find a path to select from a set of ready-
computed paths without the need to do real-time searching
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through the topology to find out an alternative path and
resolve the failure issue. This is a positive aspect that con-
tributes to the reduction of the latency especially when time is
an important factor to speed up the recovery process, although
such a contribution is not at a significant level.
Unlike the previous mentioned works, the authors in [16]
deal with the problem of reducing the number of operations
for a backup path. They showed that their algorithms can
minimise the required operations for an end-to-end calcula-
tion in order to mask a failure by up to 50%. However, there
is a lack of detail on how the simulation environment was
implemented, and as a result, how such estimates were arrived
at. Another major drawback of the approach of [16] is that it
does not guarantee a sequential chain for the alternative path;
by this we mean that the ordering of nodes is important and
selecting an alternative path on the basis of mere presence
of common nodes may not always work. The authors also
propose a threshold property that could minimise the set of
resulted paths, however, such a propertymay not always guar-
antee the feasibility of an end-to-end path. Finally, the authors
utilise the European Reference Network (ER_Net)2 [17] as a
real world topology example in their experiments. We noted
that there was a mistake in [16] and [19] within the topology
they used, since it contained 56 links and not 57 as is in the
original topology [17], prompting us to investigate further the
work done in this area of SDN fault tolerance research.
In summary, the previous studies produced different meth-
ods, techniques and tools to tackle the problem of data plane
recovery from failure events. Protection techniques are not
ideal due to the TCAM space exhaustion, whereas latency
issues are a major drawback of existing restoration methods,
since the controller has to update the failed routes in the
shortest possible time. As a result, restoration mechanisms
still need more investigation and optimisation. In this paper
we will address the restoration problem differently with a
view of accelerating the process of recovery through utilising
the already installed flow entries. Such an approach answers
the requirement (for example in harsh environments where
network failures are frequent) of finding a possibly less-than
ideal solution in the shortest amount of time, rather than
consuming a long amount of time producing the best solution.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SUMMARY
OF CONTRIBUTIONS
As we highlighted above, fault tolerance is a serious problem
facing SDN technologies nowadays and several methods have
been proposed in order to fix this issue. However, none of
these, apart form the work described in [16] (which has some
deficiencies) takes into account the problem of how to reduce
the number of the required operations when updating the
affected areas of an SDN. We believe that there is plenty of
room for improvement in terms of enhancing the efficiency
of the SDN fault tolerance process. In this respect, we aim
2The ER_Net topology is also known as Large Topology (LT) and
(COST266) according to [17] and [18], respectively.
to formulate and implement a solution to the problem of
incorporating the number of operations to find alternative
solutions in an SDN simulation environment. Additionally,
the problem of finding the shortest path will be revisited due
to its important role in the scenario of fault recovery.
Since an SDN is inherently a centralised networking
architecture, one of the main responsibilities of its central
point (controller) is to maintain the routing tables of all the
nodes on its domain. Potentially, the network forwarding
elements may operate in harsh and remote environments,
such as unreliable wireless sensor networks, where failure
rates are high. This causes frequent changes in the network’s
topology and changes in the routing tables of the forwarding
nodes [20]. In such environments, efficient re-routing tomask
a failure as quickly as possible is preferable to searching for
the best and optimal solution, which might be costly in terms
of time considering that the lifespan of a solution may not be
long enough to justify its discovery and installation costs.
With the above context in mind, we can summarise the
main contributions of this paper as follows:
• Networkmodel:Wedefine a newmodel for tackling the
problem of single SDN link failures, which is based on
the undirected graph and set theories. We use this model
in our algorithms to find a path in an optimal manner, i.e.
that requires the minimal amount of discovery time and
flow entry modification operations by the controller.
• Algorithms:We present two novel algorithms to imple-
ment the newly created model of SDN network fail-
ure. These algorithms partition a failed path in order to
optimise the problem of finding an alternative one. Our
algorithms for new path selection are incorporated in the
proposed framework, which will be described later.
• Simulations: We provide simulations of the new pro-
posed algorithms using well-known simulation tools.
Our simulation results prove that the proposed model
and algorithms improve the performance of finding
quickly an alternative path amongst a set of possi-
ble ones, and therefore enhance the process of failure
recovery.
IV. NETWORK MODEL
We start first by outlining some of the notations we use in the
rest of the paper, as shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1. List of notations.
In order to define an accurate model of the network topol-
ogy, we choose undirected graphs as the basis on which we
build the model. In general, every simple graph, G = (V ,E)
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consists of a set of vertices, V , and a set of edges, E , which
connect the vertices to one another. The set of all edges in
a graph can be defined as a 2-element subset of vertices,
E ⊆ V × V .
Based on G, we define a path P as a sequence of consecu-
tive vertices representing nodes or routers in the network.3
The path starts at the source router, rs, and ends with a
destination router, rd , with rj being any router in P:
P = (rs, . . . , rj, . . . , rd )
where j ranges over the set {1, . . . , len(P)}, and len is defined
as the length of a sequence, (a1, . . . , an), as follows:
len((a1, . . . , an)) = n ∈ N
We define for simplicity r1 = rs and rlen(P) = rd . Since a
path consists of a minimum of one edge, we therefore require
that the condition len(P) ≥ 2 always holds.
We define the set of all possible paths, Prs,rd , between any
source router rs and destination router rd , as the following set:
Prs,rd = {P | (first(P) = rs) ∧ (last(P) = rd )}
and the definition of first and last is given as functions on any
general sequence (a1, . . . , an):
first((a1, . . . , an)) = a1
last((a1, . . . , an)) = an
Now we can define a middle point in a path in terms of the
following function mid , defined over a path P as follows:
mid(P) =

{rm,Next(P, rm)} if len(P)%2 = 0
wherem = len(P)/2and len(P) 6= 2
{rm} if len(P)%2 = 1
wherem = (len(P)+ 1)/2
∅ if len(P) = 2
We refer to mid(P) in the following sections as M for sim-
plicity. The middle point represents a set consisting of either
the two mid nodes in a path, in the case where the length of
the path is even, or a single mid node, when the length of the
path is odd. We consider a path of length 2 to have an empty
middle point set.
The above definition of the middle point uses the partial
function, Next, defined over a general sequence (a1, . . . , an)
as follows:
Next((a1, . . . , ai, ai+1, . . . , an), ai) = ai+1for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and where,
Next((a1, . . . , ai, ai+1, . . . , an), an) is undefined.
Based on Next, we can define the first and second part sets
underlying a path P relative to some router rj ∈ P. We define
the partial function Below to denote the first part of a path,
and the partial function Above to denote the second part of a
path, as follows:
Below(P, rj) = {rs, ...,Prev(P, rj)}
Above(P, rj) = {Next(P, rj), ..., rd }
3We use the terms router and node interchangeably.
Where both Below(P, rs) and Above(P, rd ) are
undefined.
The definition of Below relies on another partial function,
Prev, defined over a general sequence (a1, . . . , an) as follows:
Prev((a1, . . . , ai−1, ai, . . . , an), ai) = ai−1
for any i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and where,
Prev((a1, . . . , ai−1, ai, . . . , an), a1) is undefined.
Given all the above functions, we can now define a failed
link (i.e. a 2-node sub-path), Frj , in a path P as a case of one
of two scenarios, in relation to some node rj in the path P:
Frj =

(rj,Next(P, rj)),where rj 6= rd
if the link betweenrjand Next (P, rj) fails
(Prev (P, rj), rj),where rj 6= rs
if the link between Prev (P, rj) and rj fails
This definition reflects failure in two cases with respect to a
node rj. The first case is when the failure is in the link with
the node following rj and the second when it is with the node
preceding rj. In the case that rj is the source or the destination
node, it will narrow the choice to one of the two cases only.
We use the term longest-shortest path as the path that has
the maximum number of hops amongst the set of solutions
returned by applying Dijkstra’s algorithm [21] to our network
topology for finding the shortest path between every possible
two nodes in that network. To find this longest-shortest path,
we define the special function LS as follows:
LS(PDset ) = x, suchthat x ∈ PDset and
∀y ∈ PDset : len(y) ≤ len(x)
If there are more than one longest-shortest paths in PDset ,
we pick one randomly. PDset itself represents the set of all
Dijkstra-based solutions for some network topology (V ,E):
PDset = {P | ∀ rs, rd ∈ V : P = D(Prs,rd )}
The actual definition ofDwill depend on the implementation
of Dijkstra’s algorithm. The case of the longest-shortest path
is of particular interest to us as it represents the worst case
scenario in terms of the cost of updating flow entries, since
the controller would have to deal with the highest number of
rule modifications. Every other Dijkstra-based path, which
will be shorter than the longest-shortest path, will naturally
have fewer number of such modification operations.
A. PATH AND OPERATION COSTS
In networking systems, data can be disseminated from source
to destination either through a single path, known as a uni-
cast, or through multiple paths. In a single path scenario,
which we adopt throughout this work, the network’s packets
are routed through a unique path that should meet some
predefined QoS metric(s). The feasible (e.g. shortest) path,
is typically formed on the basis of one of three QoS metric
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categories: additive, multiplicative or concave metrics [22].
Additive metrics are the outcome of the summation of char-
acteristics related to all the edges that form some path P. The
hop count is one example of the additive metric, which has
been adopted in this work. In multiplicative metrics, the out-
come is computed out of the multiplication of all the edge
characteristics in a particular path, such as for example char-
acteristics related to reliability and error free transmission.
Finally, concave metrics capture characteristics of the path in
which all the individual links have somemaximum/minimum
constraint, for example, bandwidth limits.
From an SDN point of view, the controller is not only
responsible for pushing the flow entries into the data plane
forwarding elements, but also to find the suitable path as an
advance step of the rule insertion stage. Once a new packet
arrives to the network, the first node that receives the packet
will enquire from the controller about the action that should
be taken with regards to the received packet, this is usually to
forward or drop the packet. By relying on the global view
of the network topology, the controller will determine the
optimal path for the incoming packet and send back the proper
flow entries along the computed path. Thus, distinction must
be made here between the time required for finding the path
and the time required for installing the flow entries. Most of
the current SDN controllers (e.g. POX controllers [23]) utilise
classical algorithms such as Dijkstra’s algorithm for solving
the problem of finding the shortest path. The time complexity
of shortest path algorithms, like Dijkstra’s, increases when
the size of (V × E) increases. According to [24], the search
problem in a graph can be represented as a snow ball whose
size increaseswhenever the length between rs and rd expands.
Normally, the path’s installed rules are associated with a
life time period typically called a Timeout [25]. Each partic-
ular flow entry will be automatically erased once its Timeout
value expires, however, in certain events (e.g. link failures)
the controller will need to delete some rules without waiting
for the expiry of its Timeout. In both cases, the cost for such
operations (i.e. add and remove flow entries) will be paid by
the network controller.
B. PATH ANATOMY
Some of the previously mentioned works have used the tech-
nique of disjoint paths to be employed as a backup. In such
cases, the controller will need first to remove the whole old
flow entries in the affected path and then install all the new
rules for the alternative path. This scenario could be costly
especially when the length of the affected path is long. Infor-
mally, we depict a network path’s anatomy as in Figure 1, as a
connection from rs to rd .
This sequence of adjacent routers or nodes will have some
middle router(s), which we call M , through which the path
can be divided into two halves. Finding a totally new path
from rs to rd to obviate the failure may not be a wise solution
as the cost of the update operation could be high. Hence,
we propose in our first algorithm that the M point be used to
produce two parts (i.e. sub-paths) when one of them should
FIGURE 1. Path anatomy.
be working properly while the other does not. This means
that one half of the affected path can still be utilised as is and
the operation cost to update that half should be zero, as all
the previously installed rules should remain unmodified. The
fact that we search for an alternative sub-path rather than a
complete path in this case means that the anatomy will lead
to a smaller search space and shorter times for rule updating.
Thus, a maximum ratio of flow entries utilisation with a
consideration of the previous ordering of their proprietor
routers has been studied thoroughly on the basis of this path
anatomy. In the second algorithm, we narrow this approach
to search for an alternative path only between the two nodes
surrounding a failed link.
V. OUR PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
From a high level point of view, Figure 2 illustrates the
main components of our proposed framework where the Fault
Tolerance component is the primary contribution of our work.
We discuss next in more detail the components we used and
developed in this framework.
FIGURE 2. Proposed framework components.
A. SDN CONTROLLER
Our framework currently supports the POX controller [23],
which is an open source SDN controller written in python
and it is more suitable for fast prototyping than other available
controllers such as [26]. The standard OpenFlow protocol [1]
is used for establishing the communication between the data
and control planes, whereas the set of POX APIs can be used
for developing various network control applications.
B. FAULT TOLERANCE COMPONENT
Currently, there are two main parts that constitute this com-
ponent. These are the topology parser and the path optimiser
algorithms. These two parts work together for the purpose
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of fault management and high utilisation of the currently
installed flow entries.
1) TOPOLOGY PARSER
The topology parser works based on openflow.discovery;
an already developed POX component that can be used to
produce a topological view over the data plane nodes. Our
topology parser can get the network topology from open-
flow.discovery and represents it as a graph G. In order to
do this, we utilised the Networkx tool [27], which is a pure
python package with a set of powerful functions for manipu-
lating the underlying network topology.
2) PATH OPTIMISER ALGORITHMS
This part is responsible for determining the paths for the
network’s flows based on the global view of the network
topology that can be obtained from the topology parser. The
well known Dijkstra algorithm [21] has been used for the
purpose of finding the shortest path to each new flow. In fact,
determining the shortest path is not only required when there
is a new flow, but also at the moment of failure as the path
suffering from failure will no longer have the ability to convey
the flow packets. In this part, we developed three different
algorithms each with its own view in regards to recovering
from link failures. These include the End-to-End, End-to-
Mid and Node-to-Node algorithms. Only one of these can
be identified for failure management at any one certain time
meaning that the algorithms can not be selected to work in
parallel or together as each of them has a different mechanism
to tackle the problem.
The first algorithm is the End-to-End algorithm, which
depicts the default action performed by the SDN controller at
the moment of failure. When an OpenFlow controller reports
a failure status, the failed path will be detected and then two
operations will be issued by the controller. First, a clear com-
mand is sent to all the healthy routers that belong to the failed
path, then an alternative path is computed from the source
router rs to the destination router rd . The new flow entries of
the alternative path are then forwarded to the relevant routers.
In fact, we developed this algorithm for comparison purposes
only with the next two algorithms. Unlike those, it does not
reflect a contribution of this paper. The pseudo code for the
End-to-End algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 First Algorithm to Find the Shortest Path
With Dijkstra’s From End-to-End in a Graph G
On Normal: SetPrimaryPathas Pmin ∈ Prs,rd
On Failure : Dothefollowingprocedure
1 Prs,rd := Prs,rd − {Pmin}
2 Pmin := D(Prs,rd )
The second algorithm is the End-to-Mid algorithm, which
is our first novel algorithm in this framework. Recall that
in Section IV, we defined the set of middle points, which
we called M , of a path P as M = mid(P). Relative
to M and assuming that a path would face a single link
failure at a time, this failure can be located in either the
Above(P,M ) or Below(P,M ) sides of the path. Link failure
can occur in both sides of the M point in Figure 1. However,
we do not consider in this work the simultaneous failure in
both sides of the path. In the future, we will extend the defi-
nition ofFrj to includemulti-failure scenarios. At the moment
of failure, the controller will be notified about the failed link,
and routers on both sides of the failed link will be added to
the failure set Frj . When Frj 6= (), Algorithm 2 will detect
the position of the failed link; whether it is above or belowM .
Once this is done, the affected side will be replaced by a new
sub-path, which is typically from either rs or rd to M . As a
result, a minimum of half of the flow entries will not need
replacing and will remain the same. It is worth noting here
that M could be involved in the link failure itself, however
this case does not affect the concept. The pseudo code for
this algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Second Algorithm to Find the Shortest Path
With Dijkstra’s From End-to-Mid in a Graph G
On Normal: SetPrimaryPathas Pmin ∈ Prs,rd
On Failure : Dothefollowingprocedure
1 if {rm1 , rm2} = mid(P) then
2 if rj ∈ Frj ∧ rj ∈ Above(P, rm1 ) then
3 Pmin := D(Prm2,rd )
4 end
5 if rj ∈ Frj ∧ rj ∈ Below(P, rm2 ) then
6 Pmin := D(Prs , rm1 )
7 end
8 else if {rm} = mid(P) then
9 if rj 6= rm then
10 if rj ∈ Frj ∧ rj ∈ Above(P, rm) then
11 Pmin := D(Prm,rd )
12 else
13 Pmin := D(Prs,rm )
14 end
15 end
16 if rj = rm then
17 if Next(rj) ∈ Frj then
18 Pmin := D(Prm,rd )
19 else
20 Pmin := D(Prs,rm )
21 end
22 end
23 else
24 DoNothing
25 end
The final algorithm we present here is Algorithm 3, which
is a special optimised case of Algorithm 2. In this third algo-
rithm, we attempt to find a loop-free shortest path between
the routers on both sides of the failed link, i.e. between the
two nodes of Frj . This is done instead of replacing a full
section of the path leading to the release of some of the
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non-affected rules. It is easy to notice that there will only be
two removed rules, which will reside in the routers of the fail-
ure set, hence the algorithm guarantees the minimum number
of rule modifications. The total number of added rules will be
unknown and will usually depend on the network topology
structure. The pseudo code for this algorithm is illustrated
in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Third Algorithm to Find the Shortest Path
With Dijkstra’s From Node-to-Node in a Graph G
On Normal: SetPrimaryPathas Pmin ∈ Prs,rd
On Failure : Dothefollowingprocedure
1 rn := Next(P, rj)
2 rp := Prev(P, rj)
3 if (rj, rn) = Frj then
4 Pmin := D(Prj,rn )
5 end
6 if (rp, rj) = Frj then
7 Pmin := D(Prp,rj )
8 end
The above algorithms have the same complexity of Dijk-
stra’s algorithm [21], which is O(|V | + |E| log |V |). It can be
clearly seen now that the proposed algorithms do not guaran-
tee the shortest path, as they work over part rather the whole
path. However, they reduce the number of rule modifications
instead. All the above algorithms have been evaluated and
validated through a well-known SDN simulation tool. The
following section will describe our experiments setup, results
and the different network topologies that we have adopted in
this work.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND DESIGN
In this section, we give an overview about the environment of
the carried out experiments.
A. SIMULATED NETWORK TOPOLOGIES
We used the Internet topology generator Brite [28], [29]
as a tool to create our experiment topologies. Brite utilises
some well-known models such as Waxman [30] and
Barabasi and Albert [31] to interconnect the generated
routers. Waxman’s model is a geographical approach that
connects the distributed routers in a plane based on the dis-
tance among them, which is based on the following proba-
bilistic formula:
P(u, v) = β exp−d(u,v)Lα (1)
where 0 < α and β ≤ 1. d represents the distance between u
and v, while L represents the maximum distance between any
two given nodes. The number of links among the generated
nodes is associated with the value of α in a directly propor-
tional manner, while the edge distance increases when the
value of β is incremented.We used Brite to generate four syn-
thetic large scale network topologies T1, T2, T3 and T4 based
on Waxman’s model. In addition to these, we modelled the
ER_Net [17] depicted in Figure 3, as a simulation of a real
world network topology.
FIGURE 3. European reference network (ER_Net) topology [17].
Table 2 shows the characteristics of each of these network
topologies. It can be noticed that the number of edges in
T1 and T2 is twice the number of nodes, whereas it is equal to
the number of nodes in T3 and T4. This diversity in network
topologies is needed to validate the correctness of the newly
designed framework.
TABLE 2. Topologies’ characteristics.
B. EXPERIMENTS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed framework is built on top of a POX controller
as illustrated previously in Figure 2. We evaluated our frame-
work prototype by using the Mininet emulator [32]. Mininet
is a widely used emulation system, as evidenced in a recent
survey [9], for evaluating and prototyping SDN protocols
and applications, and it can also generate custom virtual
topologies in a single Linux machine. Our experiments were
designed based on the topologies that we illustrated in the
preceding section. Since four of our experimental topologies
were designed via Brite, we utilised the Fast Network Simu-
lation Setup (FNSS) [33] python library to produce a set of
features allowing the simplification and parsing of the setup
of a network topology experiment. Therefore, FNSS acts as
an interface between Brite and Mininet. We first parsed our
generated topologies through the proper FNSS adaptors as a
step to obtain an FNSS topology object, and then converted
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the FNSS topology intoMininet to be deployed in a pure SDN
environment.
C. EXAMPLE
Let’s consider a simple example here to explain how Algo-
rithms 2 and 3 calculate an alternative path for a real network
topology, ER_Net [17]. The longest-shortest path in ER_Net
lies between Dublin and Sofia, which is:
Dublin–Glasgow–Amsterdam–Hamburg–Berlin–Prague–
Budapest–Belgrade–Sofia.
Since this path has a length of 9 cities, its mid point is
Berlin. Now, let’s assume that the linkHamburg–Berlin fails.
In this case, the proposed framework will react to the failure
by capturing the two affected nodes to be put in Frj . The
controller then will treat the failure based on the selected
algorithm. In the case of Algorithm 2, the retrieved alternative
sub-path will be:
Dublin–Glasgow–Amsterdam–Hamburg–Frankfurt–
Munich–Berlin.4
In this case, we note that the change affects only part
of the original path, namely its first half (between Dublin
and Berlin), where the failure has occurred. However, if the
selected algorithm is Algorithm 3, the alternative sub-path
returned will instead be:
Hamburg–Frankfurt–Munich–Berlin.
In this latter case, the solution is specific to the two nodes
between which the failed link lies, Hamburg and Berlin.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results to evaluate
the performance of our proposed framework. The process
of discovering the shortest path from a source router to a
destination router is considered a trivial task even for large
scale networks. However, for requirements that demand fast
fault tolerance and recovery times, e.g. when such times
should not exceed milliseconds, it is important to explore
the time required for a controller to take in order to detect
the shortest path without inserting any flow entries. To do
so, we measure the time that a POX controller takes to dis-
cover the longest-shortest path within the three algorithms
we presented in Section V. This time is dependant on the
length of the path. For instance, according to the ER_Net
topology, the path between Dublin and Sofia is considered
as the longest-shortest path with 8 hops. In the case that
there are several longest-shortest paths, we randomly choose
one. For T1 and T2, the length of the longest-shortest path
can be up to 5% of the total number of nodes, while it
can reach up to 10% in T3 and T4. In addition to this
time, the controller also requires some time to install the
newly calculated path, which introduces additional overhead.
As a result, our performed experiments on the topologies of
Table 2 can be classified into two types: the first experiment
is concerned with measuring the latency of path discovery
4We note that the link Hamburg-Frankfurt is actually missing in the
ER_Net topology example presented in [16] and [19], in which case their
results could be hugely deviant from the expected ones.
whilst the second experiment is concerned with measuring
the latency of the path setting up process. In both cases,
the performance of the proposed algorithms is reported and
analysed.
A. FIRST EXPERIMENT RESULTS
For first type of experiments, we measure the time that the
controller needs to discover the longest-shortest path, which
is Pmin for each topology. We generate a random link failure
so that Frj 6= (), in order to measure the delay of discovering
the alternative path within the three algorithms.We found that
the discovery time before the link failure is almost the same
for all the three algorithms. On the other hand, the difference
occurs in the measurements performed after the link failure.
Figure 4 shows the average time (in microsecond µs units)
to compute an alternative path once a link failure affects the
longest-shortest path.
FIGURE 4. Delay measurements in path discovery after failure.
This experiment reveals that the controller could spend
up to several 10s of milliseconds during the operation of
path discovery. We have also noticed from Figure 4 that both
Algorithms 2 and 3 require less time to find an alternative path
than Algorithm 1, where Algorithm 3 achieves the minimal
alternative path discovery time over all the five topologies.
The reason behind this time reduction is that the second
and third algorithms operate on reduced search spaces at
the moment of link failure. These results are significant in
scenarios of, e.g. harsh environments, where a path (any path,
not necessarily the shortest one) needs to be discovered fairly
quickly to replace an existing failure.
B. SECOND EXPERIMENT RESULTS
The testing process of the second type of experiments can be
summarised by the steps shown in Figure 5.
The experiment starts with taking a network topology as
an input, then the longest-shortest path, Pmin, for this topol-
ogy will be calculated. After that, two virtual hosts (called
H1 and H2) will be established for the purpose of sending
and receiving network data packets. H1 is attached to the
path source router rs, while H2 is attached to the destination
router rd (for the case of ER_Net, H1 is attached to Dublin
and H2 is attached to Sofia.) In order to measure the IP packet
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FIGURE 5. The testing process.
end-to-end delay, we set the ARP cache statically, hence,
no ARP requests or responses will be sent through the input
network.
First in this experiment, we generate an IP packet from
the source host H1 to the destination host H2 and the
end-to-end delay is measured. Afterwards, a random link
between any two neighbouring routers, which belong to
the chosen path, is selected to simulate a link failure sce-
nario. Finally, another IP packet from H1 to H2 is gener-
ated to measure the end-to-end delay after the random link
failure.
We perform the experiment in two contexts. In the first
context, the path is in a normal (i.e. healthy) condition but the
routers along the path do not have the proper rules to forward
the incoming packet, thus the controller will need to interact
with all the nodes along the path to set up the appropriate
flow entries. In the second context, the path is in an abnormal
condition involving some link failure as shown in Step 5,
in which case the routers along the path already have the flow
entries to forward the incoming packet but the packet cannot
follow the path due to the presence of the link failure. In this
case, interaction with the controller is required again in order
to divert the incoming packet away from the failed link and
towards the destination. This diversion will require inserting
and deleting certain flow entries.
The experimental results in Figures 6 and 7 show the
difference of the controller interaction in both failure and
non-failure scenarios, which correspond to Steps 4 and 7 in
Figure 5. We rely on the tcpdump for measuring the request
and response time for each issued packet.
Figure 6 demonstrates the time of the request and response
in a detailed view for both generated packets, while a com-
prehensive view is provided in Figure 7, which illustrates
the amount of time that the controller exerted to set up the
path. In other words, it is the aggregation of the request
and response times for the generated packets. We note
that the three algorithms have nearly similar durations for
setting up the path (i.e. before failure scenario), however
Algorithms 2 and 3 have different durations in comparison
to Algorithm 1 after the moment of link failure. From these
results, it is clear that our two new Algorithms 2 and 3 did
better in terms of enhancing the time cost of fault tolerance,
compared to the standard end-to-end Algorithm 1.
C. REDUCTION RATE
The proposed algorithms have shown a positive impact on
reducing the amount of time required to nominate an alter-
native path and set it up during the process of recovery
from individual link failures. According to Figure 7, we will
compare the two cases of after and before the failure as an
approach to compute the reduction rate for each algorithm.
The time difference between initialising the path before and
after the link failure is used to calculate the reduction rate.
This can be arrived at through the following formula:
R = ((Time_BF − Time_AF)÷ Time_BF)× 100 (2)
Where R is the reduction rate, Time_BF is the time of set-
ting up the primary path before the failure and Time_AF is
the time of setting up the alternative path after the failure.
Table 3 shows the reduction rates for Algorithms 2 and 3.
In the case of Algorithm 1, there is no reduction, hence we
do not include Algorithm 1 in the table. This is simply due to
the fact that the longest-shortest path, which we selected as a
primary path from each experimental topology, is basically
a shortest path between any two given nodes. Therefore,
the alternative path discovered by Algorithm 1 after the fail-
ure moment will either have an equal or greater length than
the original primary path. Therefore, the amount of time that
is required for getting the alternative path ready according to
Algorithm 1 is either similar or higher in comparison with
the scenario of path initialization (i.e. before failure) and this
can be observed from the results of Algorithm 1 in Figure 7.
Both Algorithms 2 and 3, on the other hand, have better
performance in minimising the operation cost and speeding
up the process of recovery as shown in Table 3. As expected,
Algorithm 3 outperforms Algorithm 2 achieving the best
reduction rate that always exceeds 50%.
TABLE 3. Reduction rates for Algorithms 2 and 3.
In fact, the reason behind the accomplished reduction rates
of Algorithms 2 and 3 as shown in Table 3 is that we reduce
the number of flow entry modifications through maximising
the utilisation of the pre-installed rules and therefore the per-
centage of interaction between the controller and the affected
data plane elements will be decreased. The solution returned
by either of these two algorithms is a sub-path (representing
the nodes that require rule updates) guaranteed to be shorter
than the original path. Each algorithm has a different way to
utilise the previous installed flow entries, so we will provide
a different formula to each one.
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FIGURE 6. Request and response measurements. (a) ER Net_ topology. (b) T1 Topology. (c) T2 Topology. (d) T3 Topology. (e) T4 Topology.
For Algorithm 2, the utilisation rate ranges between 50%
and less due to the fact that the rule modification will include
only the part of the path suffering from failure. In other
words, the changes will encompass either the first half from
rs to M or the second half from M to rd (see Figure 1).
Since M could contain either one element, when the length
of the path is odd, or two, when the length is even (see
section IV), this will result in two formulae for gauging the
utilisation of existing rules in the nodes of the path. In case of
a singleton M , and where len(rs, . . . , rd ) = n, the utilisation
rate can be measured using the formula ( n−12n )×100%. On the
other hand, when M has two elements, then the utilisation
rate can be defined using the formula ( n2n )× 100%, which is
equal to 50%.
For Algorithm 3, the utilisation rate will be higher than for
Algorithm 2 since it does not rely on M and therefore most
of the flow entries of the primary path will be reused again
and employed for the new alternative one. Let us assume that
len(rs, . . . , rd ) = n, then the utilisation rate of Algorithm 3
can bemeasured through ( n−2n )×100%. As a result, the larger
the value of n, the more utilisation we obtain out of the
existing path.
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FIGURE 7. Before and after failure measurements. (a) ER Net_ topology. (b) T1 Topology. (c) T2 Topology. (d) T3 Topology. (e) T4 Topology.
D. SUCCESS RATE
One of the important issues with the proposed
Algorithms 2 and 3 is the success rate percentage. We define
the success rate as the percentage (success÷len(PDset ))×100.
Similarly, one can define the failure rate as the percentage
(fail÷ len(PDset ))× 100. The values of both success and fail
are calculated as in the flowchart of Figure 8.
According to this flowchart, all the shortest paths between
any two possible pair of nodes, which are stored in PDset ,
are utilised in this evaluation. Starting with the first path that
belongs to PDset , a random link failure is generated. After
that, the state of the alternative path will be checked through
applying the Algorithmx function, which is a function that
reflects either Algorithm 2 or 3. Every time Algorithmx
succeeds in obtaining a solution, the success variable will be
incremented, otherwise the fail variable will be incremented
instead. We then re-attach the broken edge, which was ran-
domly selected in the earlier stage, to the network graph G
and continue the process for the next path until we reach the
last path Plen (PDset ).
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FIGURE 8. Flowchart for calculating success and fail variables.
TABLE 4. Success rates for Algorithms 2 and 3.
Using this flowchart, we examined all the topologies from
Table 2 for our two new algorithms and the success rate
results we obtained are outlined in Table 4.
In many cases involving random failure generation con-
ducted over the T3 and T4 networks, our algorithms failed
to find a feasible path, hence the low percentage of success.
It can be also noticed from Table 4 that Algorithm 3 is more
risky than Algorithm 2 in some cases. Although, we have
an anticipation that T3 and T4 may not reflect a real world
network topology due to the lack of links and alternative
paths, we assumed that these represent complex enough cases
of network topologies to highlight this limitation of our pro-
posed algorithms.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a new model for SDN to tackle
the problem of finding efficiently alternative paths in cases
of single link failures. In many works in literature, the prob-
lem has been tackled in terms of finding the shortest paths,
without paying much attention to the time latency incurred
in discovering and installing such paths. In scenarios, such as
harsh environments, it is more important to find and install a
path quickly without wasting much time as the lifetime of
paths can be short anyway. We showed how the proposed
model can be implemented using a couple of new algorithms
that divide the anatomy of a path to achieve a quick and
optimum solution to the problem of finding and replacing a
failed link.
We demonstrated how the proposed algorithms utilise
existing pre-installed flow entries through dealing with a
sub-path of the original shortest path at the moment of
failure. The resulting new path, though not necessarily a
shortest path itself, is guaranteed to have better utilisation
of the existing rules than in the case of an end-to-end path
discovery algorithm, therefore leading to the acceleration
of the operation of path recovery in terms of both min-
imising the discovery time and the number of flow entry
modifications.
Our experiments were performed over a number of various
types of network topologies conducted with randomly gen-
erated link failures. The experimental findings demonstrated
the effectiveness of the proposed framework in enhancing
the recovery from failure scenarios involving single failures.
Our framework suffers from a couple of main issues: First,
it does not guarantee the shortest path, and second, in some
network cases (e.g. when it is hard to find an alliterative
path) the proposed algorithms may fail to find a feasible
solution.
For future work, further research will be conducted to
consider scenarios of multiple link failures. In addition,
we are currently working on considering some definitions
of reliability that are quantitative, for example, including
risk and security measures and metrics in order to obtain
a more robust definition of the cost function that aims to
guide the influenced packets into the safest route. We are also
planning to apply machine learning as a technique to study
the network topology features for the purpose of initiating
virtual communities, which could play an important role to
improve the performance of the network in terms of failure
recovery.
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